![]() |
Why
Do Representations Matter? |
![]() |
| |
|
The world today and its many technologies have meant that people are exposed to an array of visual representations representing just about anything. According to Urry (1990), the postmodern person (post World War II) is a voyeur, someone who sits and gazes. 'This a looking culture' he says, 'organised in terms of a variety of visual images portraying all things imaginable' in magazines, television, cinema and the Internet (Urry, 1990: 135) among others. In other words, representations, especially visual, have become an important part of daily life that influences and constructs meaning about the world people live in. How meanings are constructed is not a simple process. It is not a simple matter of gazing at a picture in a magazine, taking meaning from it and then assuming that everyone else will interpret it the same way. On the contrary, representations change and shift with context, usage and historical circumstances. They are never finally fixed nor are they always real (fantasies, mermaids, fairies and so on). Instead 'they are always being negotiated and inflected' (Hall, 1997: 9-10). Hall's (1997) definition of representation is, 'the process by which members of a culture use language to produce meaning' (Hall, 1997: 61). This may appear quite simple however the words 'culture', 'language' and 'meaning' involve certain complex systems of representation. Language for example, involves the process of semiotics (symbols, signs and codes) (Palmer, 1991: 8-9); culture involves the process of shared sets of concepts, images and ideas (Hall, 1997: 3). It 'is communication', according to Duncan (1962: 35). Meaning derives from individual experiences, knowledge and understanding, creating conceptual maps that enable people to relate to 'objects, people, events, abstract ideas' and so on (Hall in During, 1997: 19). Knowledge and power are related as Foucault (1980) explains. To him, 'elements (discourses, institutions, regulations, morality and so on) are always related to power which in turn generates knowledge............people acquire their knowledge within institutional frameworks and this knowledge influenced by power, enables the deciphering, interpreting and understanding of representations' (Foucault, 1980: 194-196). Institutional frameworks, according to Althusser (1971), 'function by 'ideology'' (Althusser, 1971: 136). They involve apparatuses of culture or what Althusser refers to as 'ideological state apparatuses' (ISAs). These ISAs are the apparatuses of communication of which images, meanings and slogans (among others) define the worlds in which people live. Taken as a whole ISAs guide, define, and expropriate experience; give meaning to them (Denzin, 1992: 98). Within a constructional approach, systems of representation are 'organised, clustered, arranged and classified', thus establishing complex relations between them (Hall, 1997: 17). There are many forms of representation and as Hall (1997) explains, representations may be physical, mental or symbolic and they vary in abstractness. Physical (visual) representations may be picture-like such as photographs, drawings, maps and diagrams. They can be language-like, such as natural human languages like English or French and technical such as computer languages (Hall, 1997: 17-18). These languages may be in the form of words, facial expressions and gestures (Hall, 1997: 5). Mental representations include emotions, ideas and concepts. Symbolic representations include any object that symbolises one (sign) or a number of things (icons) - the simulcra (Palmer, 1991: 8; Denzin, 1992: 98). Although signs and icons may belong to the same form, they differ in the way they work. A sign such as the letter 'T' has no meaning in itself; neither does the sign 'R' or 'E'. Even when placed in a sequence such as 'TREE', the word still has no meaning. It is only when the word is constructed and fixed by a code, does its meaning make sense and then not to everyone. For example, those who do not recognise the signs that make up the English language will not recognise the word 'TREE'. It is in the visual sign of a 'TREE' that concepts may be shared (Hall, 1997: 19-21). The visual sign in this case is called an icon. Meanings attached to an icon are not fixed. They may be simple such as the 'TREE' (it can be assumed that most people understand what a tree is) or complex such as sporting champions. For example, Hayley Lewis (Australian Olympic swimming champion) is often referred to as an Australian icon. To many subjects, Haley represents success, femininity (textually-mediated discourse), health, family, motherhood and marriage (positive regimes of representation). For others she represents depression, obesity (not that she was grossly overweight) and oppression (an object of desire for men within a patriarchal society) (negative regimes of representation). For any individual, each of these institutional representations involve different and varied emotional responses. Considered as an Australian icon, Hayley is required to conduct herself as representative of what constitutes being an Australian. Shane Warne is perhaps an example of what can happen if this representation is tainted, in other words, the power within representation (cost him his vice-captaincy and much of his admiring public, not only within Australia). Whatever the case may be subjects identify with what is being represented through a process called 'interpellation' (Woollacott, 1986: 206-209; Greenfield and Williams, 1991: 125). Althusser (1971) devised this term while explaining how ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) (representation is considered one apparatus functioning within institutions and defined by ideology), although the most private, absolve the purely political function to 'impress on the blank page of the undetermined individual' his/her social and private identity (Althusser, 1971: 136-138). With this, Althusser redefined ideology as a continuous and all-pervasive set of practices in which all groups and classes participate (Fiske, 1992: 176-178). He stressed that ideology doesn't represent the world per se, but human beings' relation to that real world, to their perceptions of the real conditions of existence. In other words, ideology is the imaginary version, the represented version, the stories people tell each other about their relation to the real world (Althusser, 1969: 231-236). By treating ideologies as 'systems of representations', Althusser gave a more semiotic or discursive definition of ideology itself. He rejected the notion of 'false consciousness' as believed in fundamental Marxism, and much of the Frankfurt School, which resulted from the emulation of the dominant ideology (political) by those whose interests it did not reflect. Instead he believed that ideology worked to a large extent on the 'social unconsciousness' for example, the 'common sense of individuals' and an acceptance that things are 'natural, obvious and given' (Donald and Hall, 1986: xvii). Social unconsciousness refers to the assumption that social relations and practices give their own, unambiguous knowledge to perceiving, thinking subjects; that there is a transparent relationship between the situations in which subjects are placed and how subjects come to recognise and know about them (Hall, 1996: 16-18). This explanation of ideology becomes problematic in that it does not explain how such a system of mass representations and/or structures actually work? In other words, how does this explanation of ideology 'recruit' people into their perspectives of the world? Althusser believed 'the identity of an individual (the subject) takes place according to a pre-established series of identification in the values imposed by the laws of different institutions such as religion and the media' (Taccheri, 1998: 1). In other words, the only way an individual can become a subject is by 'subjecting' himself (subject being the one that performs the action, but also the one who is acted upon) to the existing values given by these institutions (Tacceri, 1998: 1). By deploying the philosophical category of the subject, Donald and Hall suggest it is not the 'biological person', rather the social category in which people exist as social beings. This is not a naturally occurring entity but a 'symbolically constructed' one, one that 'signifies (Hall in During, 1997: 26). This both names and positions a subject, for example, a subject of the family. It may also be called 'spontaneous identification' (Donald and Hall, 1986: xvii). In other words, a subject may identify with their place within a particular discourse and recognise the sorts of characteristics which that discourse involves. Therefore, interpellation is used to explain why people think and behave the way they do, how they construct their lives and how they communicate with others. Media theorists for example, use Althusser's theory of interpellation to explain the political function of mass media texts. 'As a pre-existing structure, the text interpellates the spectator, so constituting him/her as a subject' (Lapsley & Westlake, 1988: 12). The subject (viewer, listener, reader) is constituted by the text, and the power of the mass media resides in their ability to 'position' the subject in such a way that representations within the text are reflections of everyday reality. Once interpellated, subjects become part of a unified social structure (Curran, 1977: 25). For example, the interpellated subject of the home gym advertisement would thus order the gym; behave as if bodybuilding as rigorous exercise was a necessity, something of central importance. The subject here would be some notion of physical perfection, or body cult, the rules that the subject is subjected to and believes (Klages, 1997: 1). In short, Althusser says, 'there is no practice except by and in an ideology' and 'there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subjects' (Althusser, 1971: 141-142). Critics argue that these theorists do not allow for the possibility of individuals resisting the process of interpellation, whereas ISAs are not invariably and completely successful; the subject can be an agent as well as effect (Lapsley & Westlake, 1988: 15). Resisting the process of interpellation as Curran (1977) suggests is 'against the processes within which ideology works.............. ideology becomes the route through which struggle is obliterated rather than the site of struggle' (Curran, 1977: 26). Ideologies are not simply imposed by governments, business interests or the media as their agents - although this possibility always remains an institutional option through mechanisms of direct control such as censorship. Rather, media forms and representations 'constitute major sites for conflict and negotiation, a central goal of which is the definition of what is to be taken as 'real'' (Gledhill, 1997: 348). Realism, then, is a crucial value claimed by different parties to the contest. Therefore, Althusser's concept of social unconsciousness looses momentum as those outside the ideologies of dominant institutions such as Aborigines and women, are actively engaged in the formation of discourses of their own, more a case of social consciousness perhaps. Engaging in such practices does tend to leave those oppressed groups with a stereotype, more often than not labeled as 'different', the Other' (Neale, 1993: 41). Difference according to Neale (1993) is the result of a 'comparison against the real' and the 'ideal' (Neale, 1993: 41-44). He discusses difference in terms of stereotyping and the analysis of character and characterisations within texts (Neale, 1993: 41). For example, within television, women (especially young, slim, blonde women) are often portrayed as 'dumb'. This stereotype is repeated constantly and with different characters, usually within similar genres (regime of representation) such as soap operas or situation comedies. Similarly, Heath (1990) describes the fascination with 'the figure of the woman - depicted, defined, displayed, diagnosed in a kind of ceaseless concern' (Heath, 1990: 51) during the Victorian era of narratives. The woman was seen as different from the ultimate - the man. She was and still is the Other - struggling, disturbed and hysterical. Berger (1974), when analysing European paintings, refers to 'the woman' as a presence 'expressed in her own attitude', ' manifested in her gestures, voice, opinions, expressions, clothes, chosen surroundings and taste' (Berger, 1974: 46). The man is 'powerful, moral, physical, temperamental, economic, social and sexual' (Berger, 1974: 45). The social presence of a woman and the ideologies and doctrines of femininity have been enunciated, 'interpreting the representation and its embodied correlate' in women's appearances (Smith, 1988: 43). The man (ideal) and the woman (different) have become fixed in people's psychological perceptions of realism, (Neale, 1993: 44; Neale, 1993: 44), realism being the 'set of conventions of portrayal, that at a certain time and place are able to pass themselves off as realistic', becoming unified into 'reality', reality in this sense being the subject and object of representation (Ellis, 1982: 6-9). A social discourse on the nature of human sexuality (the notion of the body and difference) has been constructed. Discourse according to Foucault is a system of representation that involves language and practice and since 'all social practices entail meaning, and meaning shapes and influences what we [people] do [conduct], all practices have a discursive aspect' (Hall and Gieben, 1992: 291). A discursive approach to representation provides a 'revolutionary means of understanding how ideas (statements) are elaborated in the context of ideology (Muecke, 1982: 99), however unlike ideology, Foucault moved away from semiotics, instead believing that human beings understand themselves and others and acquire knowledge about the 'social, the embodied individual and shared meanings' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 17) through 'relations of power, not relations of meaning' (Hall, 1997: 43). Meaning is not fixed nor can it be reduced simply to a calm form of language and dialogue (Foucault, 1980: 115). Not denying that things may have a real existence, Laclau and Mouffe (1990) suggest that every social practice is meaningful; therefore discourse is about where that meaning comes from (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990: 100-101) and how it is constructed, not what it is (as is the case with ideology). He has been critisised for 'absorbing too much into discourse', neglecting other power/knowledge relationships with the economy, materialism and structural factors. This may be true however, without the relationship between knowledge, power and the body, he believes that representations, with their commodifying, structural and material implications, have little to no impact on the subject. In other words, the subject will be unable to position him/herself within the representation because he/she will not understand it. Any material, economic or structural outcome will be minimised (Hall, 1997: 51-53). For example, to understand the concept of someone as healthy, the subject must have knowledge about health such as what food to eat, how the body functions and so on; understand the rules and guidelines surrounding the concept such as 'no smoking' and 'exercise regularly', be able to relate the concept with subjects who personify the discourse (Olympians for example); know how this concept acquires its truth, its knowledge of being real (confirmation from health professionals such as dieticians and medical practitioners and statistics concerning related death rates) and an acknowledgment that the truth surrounding this concept is changing, expanding if you like, as more knowledge becomes available (Hall, 1997: 45-46). Once the subject understands those conditions attached to this concept, any representation of it makes sense. Structural, economic and material outcomes follow. Health related businesses and organisations such as gymnasiums and pharmacies for example are established, products are manufactured and purchased and policies are made within health organisations and other institutions, hence the construction of a national popular culture. It is within this national popular culture that major ideologies of a culture are played out in daily discourse (Denzin, 1992: 117) through language. Both Althusser (ideology) and Foucault (discourse) have contributed a great deal to the understanding and importance of representation in the formation of cultures and the production of meaning. Institutions such as education, religion, family and health recruit and mould its subjects into particular ways of thinking (governmentalisation and interpellation), often rejecting those who do not conform to certain rules and guidelines (producing stereotypes). This tends to produce sub groups or subcultures, perceived as 'different' and for the most part, treated as such. Of these groups, many of which are quite large (the young, the elderly, the single parent, the homosexual and so on), representations become a site of struggle whereby their own ideological versions of their culture's dream are unable to be fulfilled or at the very least, become difficult to achieve. These sites of struggle play an important part of culture as they challenge dominant ideologies and discourses, often resulting in new ones being developed. Incorporated in all this are the concepts of knowledge and power, both of which are dependent on each other. Whatever the position of the subject though, the power ultimately lies within the subject to accept or reject what is being represented, it also lies within the institution that provides the knowledge and in the power of the medium used to portray this knowledge through representations. In other words, power and knowledge through language constructs meaning and meaning produces and constructs cultures through communication (the body) - all of which occur at the site of representation. It may be concluded therefore, that representations matter a great deal. ****** PLEASE NOTE ******
Last Updated 20/06/03 © Kelta Web Concepts 2003 All rights reserved
|